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The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was adopted by the European Union (EU) as a 
means toward harmonization of the value-added tax (VAT) system.  The Framers of Directive 
77/388/EEC believed that a disjointed VAT tax system that existed previously was harmful to 
the common market’s guarantee of free movement of goods and services that are subject to the 
VAT tax.  The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the subject of the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC reflects four dominant patterns, including the limitation of 
member-states to dictate the parameters of the VAT tax, that additional administrative measures 
cannot be adopted by member-states, that variations among member-states will only be tolerated 
if no threat to harmonization exists, and that the ECJ will draft opinions that promote efficiency 
in trade and combat tax avoidance.  Problematically, the ECJ’s allowing for too much discretion 
for member-state legislatures and national courts in conjunction with the use of a Directive to 
legislatively push for harmonization have left the EU with serious threats to a VAT tax system 
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that can be best described as fragile.  If left in this fragile state, the level of harmonization that 





A U.S. firm engaged in the scope of international business must consider the implications 
of the world’s VAT tax system.2  More specific to the European continent, one of the most 
significant challenges to a business operating in the European Union (“EU”) is the ability to 
comply with 28 different tax administrations – one for each EU member-state.3  Despite these 
challenges, the EU’s common market has been so enticing that many American firms have 
moved their factory operations to the EU in order to make and sell their goods within the EU 
without restrictions that would otherwise be associated with exported goods coming into the 
EU.4  The EU constitutes a common market that requires the free movement of goods, services, 
capital, and labor.5  The EU’s common market also requires the reduction of non-tariff barriers 
as well as the harmonization of law across the member-states.6   
 One of the purposes of EU law is to address the various problems associated with a 28-
member union through a body of transnational law.7  One of the chief responsibilities of the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) is to ensure that the 28 member-states observe the EU 
Treaties, Regulations, and Directives that constitute the corpus of EU law.8  The ECJ, through its 
judgments, has engaged in high levels of judicial activism in order to further harmonize the 
common market’s principles across the EU’s member-states.9  Regardless of the mission of the 
ECJ, there exists a belief that the EU member-states are losing the ability to combat tax 
avoidance due to the ECJ’s jurisprudence, which, according to the criticism, actually makes tax 
avoidance easier.10 
 Globalization has threatened the tax bases of national governments in such a way that the 
international tax community is mired in a debate on tax avoidance and the proper associated 
responsibilities for both multinational corporations and governments.11  Tax avoidance, 
                                                 
2 ALAN SCHENK, VICTOR THURONYI, & WEI CUI, VALUE ADDED TAX: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH 1 (2nd 
ed. 2015). 
3 BEN J. M. TERRA & PETER J. WATTEL, EUROPEAN TAX LAW 3 (6th ed. 2012). 
4 TONY CLEAVER, UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD ECONOMY 121-122 (4th ed. 2013). 
5 Id. at 78. 
6 Id. 
7 DAMIAN CHALMERS, GARETH DAVIES & GIORGIO MONTI, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 2 (2nd ed. 2010). 
8 Id. at 143. 
9 MICHELLE CINI & NIEVES PEREZ-SOLORZANO BORRAGAN, EUROPEAN UNION POLITICS 257 (4th ed. 2013). 
10 Lilian V. Faulhaber, Sovereignty, Integration, and Tax Avoidance in the European Union: Striking the 
Proper Balance, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 177, at 179 (2010). 
11 CHRISTIANA HJI PANAYI, EUROPEAN UNION CORPORATE TAX LAW 4 (2013). 
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regardless of the form of tax being avoided, creates two negative realities, including a greater 
disrespect for taxing authorities and the reduction of revenue whereby the various member-state 
governments cannot reinvest in their populations.12  One estimate is that the avoidance of value-
added tax (“VAT tax”) alone costs the EU €100 billion each year.13  The EU Commission has 
become more aggressive as of late in clamping down on illegal tax breaks and other forms of tax 
avoidance especially in cases that lead to distortion of competition within the EU common 
market.14  The EU Commission has gone as far as to find entire member-state tax regimes to be 
illegal as they drain the EU of revenue.15  Some of the world’s largest multinational firms are 
facing the threat of paying significant amounts in back taxes.16  Just recently, the European 
Commission commanded that the Apple Corporation pay the Irish government €13 billion in 
back taxes excused as the result of a tax agreement between Apple and Ireland, which the 
European Commission found to be a violation of EU rules on state aid.17  More specific to the 
VAT tax avoidance problem in Europe, the EU Commission has attempted to gain information 
from the 28 member-states on the amount of VAT tax avoidance, but to date, only two member-
states have responded to the information request.18  For countries that are members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OCED”), a group of countries for 
which many EU member-states belong, along with the United States, tax avoidance rates are 
roughly the same.19  Regardless of the international attention paid to tax avoidance, there is some 
debate as to whether member-states within the EU have a duty to combat those entities that seek 
to avoid the payment of taxes.20   
 Across the Atlantic, the United States government is concerned that the EU 
Commission’s attempts at finding tax avoidance are unfairly targeting American-based firms.21  
There exists a bit of a divide between the U.S. and its trading partners on the issue of the VAT 
tax.  The EU, in its attempts to define the scope of the VAT tax within its jurisdiction, has 
deemed the virtual currency Bitcoin to be subject to its VAT tax system, which applies to the 
                                                 
12 Faulhaber, supra note 10, at 207. 
13 VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936.  
14 Tom Fairless, EU Orders Belgium to Recover Unpaid Taxes From 35 Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 11, 2016, 
12:44PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-to-rule-on-illegal-tax-breaks-for-multinationals- 1452506740.  
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Arthur Beasley, Apple to Start Paying €13bn to Ireland Over Back Tax Claim, THE FINANCIAL TIMES 
(April 24, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9ee3943e-47d3-11e8-8ae9-4b5ddcca99b3.  
18 VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936. 
19 The Pros and Cons of VAT: A Last Resort, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016.  
20 PANAYI, supra note 11, at 162. 
21 James Willhite, EU Corporate Tax Crackdown Expands, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2015, 6:20AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/12/03/the-morning-ledger-eu-corporate-tax-crackdown-expands/.  
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purchase of goods and services.22  Showing that national governments may disagree on the same 
question of law, the United States’ Commodity Futures Trading Commission has held that 
Bitcoin should be treated not as a currency for purchasing goods and services but instead a 
commodity that is purchased.23  Recently, China’s VAT tax regime has been challenged by the 
United States as discriminatory toward American-manufactured small aircraft exports to China.24  
The United States government has further argued that the Chinese VAT tax system is not 
transparent in violation in World Trade Organization rules.25   
 
II. TAX LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
  
Each domestic tax law enacted by a member-state of the EU must be within the scope of 
EU law set forth by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).26  Domestic 
tax regulations can be a chief barrier to further integration of the EU’s common market, which 
requires the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor.27  The scope and limitations of 
EU law are based in the TFEU and any powers not provided to the EU are reserved to the 
member-states through the concept of power through conferral.28  Regardless, any tax regime 
constructed by an EU member-state is heavily influenced by EU law.29  The scope of EU tax law 
applies to the entire territory of the member-states that constitute the EU, and all nationals of EU 
member-states, unless a specific exemption to the contrary in EU law applies.30 
 The power to tax was a critical part of the EU’s founding treaties.31  The EU Council is 
comprised of the heads of government from the 28 member-states and is charged with crafting 
Directives that define directions and priorities of the EU.32  A Directive is one of five acts that 
can be adopted by the EU government if the TFEU provides it should do so.33  An EU Directive 
                                                 
22 Jacob Gershman, For Bitcoin, EU Tax Ruling Was Right On The Money, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/10/22/for-bitcoin-eu-tax-ruling-was-right-on-the-money/.  
23 Id. 
24 William Mauldin, U.S. Brings WTO Case Against China Over Smaller Planes, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 
2015, 10:10AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-brings-wto-case-against-china-over-smaller-planes- 1449587899.  
25 Chun Han Wong, China Expresses Regret Over U.S. Trade Challenge, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2015, 
7:18AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-expresses-regret-over-u-s-trade-challenge-1449663481.  
26 PANAYI, supra note 11, at 3. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 110 (7th ed. 2010). 
29 PANAYI, supra note 11, at 3. 
30 Dimitry Kochenov, Substantive and Procedural Issues in the Application of European Law in the 
Overseas Possessions of European Union Member States, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L. L. 195, at 201 (2008). 
31 Agustin Jose Menendez, Taxing Europe: Two Cases For A European Power To Tax (With Some 
Comparative Observations), 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 297, at 298 (2004). 
32 CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 75. 
33 HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 105. 
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is different than an EU Regulation in that the latter specifies rules that apply at the EU level and 
national level with no discretion for the member-state.34  Directives, in contrast, are not binding 
on member-states but require the member-state to enact domestic legislation to achieve a 
particular goal.35  Therefore, in the case of a Directive, the member-state is given discretion to 
determine which method is most suitable to achieve the goal behind the Directive.36  Depending 
upon the construction of the Directive by the EU Council, the Directive may leave little room for 
the member-state to achieve that goal.37  In most cases, a new Directive gives the EU’s member-
states 18 to 24 months to enact implementing legislation.38  A Directive is also deemed to be of 
“indirect effect” in that it does not impose obligations on individuals.39 
 The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was designed to further harmonize the VAT tax 
system within the EU – a process started by the first five Directives.40  There were 53 Articles 
within the Sixth Council Directive.41  Since the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was in fact 
a Directive, and not a Regulation, the goal of the EU Council was to get the member-states to 
craft implementing legislation that would harmonize the VAT tax system on the various areas 
which the Sixth Council Directive touched.42  The Sixth Council Directive created a framework 
for a uniform VAT tax base in the form of upper and lower limits whereby the upper limits 
would be flexible but the lower limits inflexible.43  Directive 77/388/EEC has been amended 
over time to make the EU economy more competitive.44  Council Directive 2006/112/EC recast 
the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC but did not affect its substantive content.45  
A Seventh Directive was later added to combat economic trade distortion.46  There exists 
criticism of the Sixth Council Directive because it has not met its ultimate goal of making sure 
that all goods and services are taxed at the final point of consumption.47 




37 HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 106. 
38 CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 7, at 99. 
39 HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 234. 
40 Rachel J. Tischler, The Power to Tax Involves the Power to Destroy: How Avant-Garde Art Outstrips the 
Imagination of Regulators, and Why A Judicial Rubric Can Save It, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1665, at 1673 (2012). 
41 TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 3, at 305. 
42 Id. at 172. 
43 MARGOT HORSPOOL & MATTHEW HUMPHREYS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 286-287 (7th ed. 2012). 
44 Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Biometrics: Solving The Regressivity of VATs and RSTs With Smart 
Card” Technology, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 651, at 684-685 (2006). 
45 TERRA & WATTEL, supra note 3, at 305. 
46 Tischler, supra note 39, at 1674. 
47 Stephen Bill, Practical Application of European Value Added Tax to E-Commerce, 38 GA. L. REV. 71, at 
71 (2003). 
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 All OECD members, save the United States, employ a VAT tax, a tax on consumption of 
goods and services and not income.48  Even at the time of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, all 
member-states except for France used a version of the VAT tax system.49  The EU member-
states were first ordered in 1967 to have a VAT tax system in place by 1970 pursuant to the First 
and Second Directives on the VAT tax.50  The VAT tax has been described as an indirect, 
general tax applied by member-states to goods and services.51  The VAT tax is an indirect tax in 
that it is paid by a consumer of goods and services instead of the traditional taxpayer.52  A 
consumer generally sees the VAT tax as a sales tax in that the tax is assessed at each level of 
production of a good or service throughout the stream of commerce.53  The total value added by 
a firm is equal to the total income earned on each factor of production.54  The VAT tax is also 
considered a general tax in that it is designed to apply to all expenditures associated with the 
consumption of goods and services, which includes all stages of the stream of commerce such as 
production and distribution.55  The VAT tax is also deemed to be neutral in that it is assessed and 
collected at each step in the stream of commerce.56  The deduction mechanism of the EU’s VAT 
tax system ensures that within each member-state’s territory, goods and services maintain the 
same tax level.57 
 In regard to international trade throughout the EU, the VAT tax can always apply to an 
import regardless of whether the importer is a firm or private person; however, the VAT tax 
cannot apply to exports.58  Pursuant to the EU’s VAT tax system, the exporting member-state 
accounts for sales of exports, but not at the border, thereby reducing any trade friction at the 
border.59  Exports come into the member-state with the exporting country’s taxes, and the 
importing country will later invoice the exporting country to recoup VAT taxes.60  The VAT tax 
is an important part of the EU government budget as the EU does not have the power to directly 
                                                 
48 The Pros and Cons of VAT: A Last Resort, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016.  
49 HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 286.   
50 ANTONIO CALISTO PATO & MARLON TAVARES MARQUES, FUNDAMENTALS OF VAT 15-16 (2015). 
51 Bill, supra note 46, at 72. 
52 PATO & MARQUES, supra note 49, at 20. 
53 VAT Fraud in the European Union: A Tax Net Full of Holes, THE ECONOMIST (May 11, 2006), 
http://www.economist.com/node/6923936. 
54 LARRY NEAL, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 135 (2007). 
55 PATO & MARQUES, supra note 49, at 22. 
56 Id. at 24. 
57 Id. 
58 HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 286, 287. 
59 NEAL, supra note 53, at 136. 
60 Id. 
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tax Europeans directly.61  When a taxable person pays VAT tax, one part of the total tax goes to 
the member-state, and a second part goes to the EU government’s coffers.62   
 
III. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE VAT TAX. 
  
One commentator states that the VAT tax has circumscribed the globe more quickly than 
any other form of taxation in modern history.63  Neal cites two advantages to a VAT tax, 
including an incentive for firms to honestly report taxes and an end to the debate on how taxes 
should be levied on labor and capital.64  Regardless, the VAT tax system has been criticized as 
being so complex that it is not well understood.65  The eventual goal is to move the application of 
the VAT tax in the EU from the state of destination to the state of origin of goods and services, 
but this reality has not been achieved to date.66  Previous to efforts to harmonize the VAT tax 
system, VAT tax differences within the EU distorted trade among the member-states.67  
Regardless, despite incredible efforts at harmonization, there exist VAT tax differences across 
the member-states.68  Differences in VAT tax application across the member-states still leads to 
some trade distortion and high administrative costs associated with accounting for VAT tax.69 
 Comparatively, sales and VAT taxes make up a greater portion of the overall tax bill in 
Europe than in the United States.70  The United States does not implement a VAT-like tax or 
sales tax except at the state and local government levels.71  However, there is comment that the 
concept of a VAT tax is growing support in the United States despite previous arguments that the 
VAT tax hurts the poor and serves as a funds-generator for the implementing government.72  
Many who claim that too much income inequality exists in the United States also argue a 
consumption-based tax system, if implemented in the United States, would reduce that inequality 
in that such a tax system would be progressive and allow the federal government to redistribute 
                                                 
61 CINI & BORRAGAN, supra note 9, at 5. 
62 Menendez, supra note 30, at 306. 
63 SCHENK, ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
64 NEAL, supra note 53, at 135. 
65 Menendez, supra note 30, at 307. 
66 HORSPOOL & HUMPHREYS, supra note 42, at 287. 
67 NEAL, supra note 53, at 135. 
68 CLEAVER, supra note 4, at 128. 
69 Id. 
70 PAUL KUBICEK, EUROPEAN POLITICS 273 (2012). 
71 SCHENK ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
72 The Pros and Cons of VAT: A Last Resort, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016.  
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income at greater levels.73  Conservatives, in contrast, have argued against the VAT tax, 
contending that such a tax system makes it too easy for governments to raise revenue.74  Still 
other supporters argue the use of the VAT tax system in the United States would shore up the 
U.S. Treasury, would be less visible and easier to implement than income tax because taxable 
persons would not have to file returns, and would expand the tax base and help pay for cash-
strapped federal programs.75  Although a VAT tax in the United States would likely end the 
deduction for interest on mortgages, an advisory committee in California actually endorsed a 
VAT tax for that state.76 
 
IV. THE PURPOSE OF THIS WORK 
  
The purpose of this work is three-fold.  First, this work is designed to provide a working 
knowledge of the EU’s VAT tax system through the lens of the ECJ’s jurisprudence.  Second, 
this paper will provide an insight into the difficulties associated with the use of a Directive and 
accompanying jurisprudence in an effort to harmonize an area of law across the EU’s member-
states.  Third, and most importantly, this work will examine whether the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC is having the intended effect of harmonizing the VAT tax law across the EU. 
 
 
V. DECISIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
  
This work will provide an examination of the jurisprudence of the ECJ on the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC through various cases placed into thirteen categories, including 
profits, language and uniformity, federalism, relations between organizations, forms of business 
association and location of services, additional taxes implemented by member-states, method of 
VAT tax refunds, additional administrative requirements, specific use of goods, member-state 
discretion, financial transactions, tax evasion, and shifting VAT tax liability. 
 
 A. Profits 
  
In Kennemer Golf v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, the ECJ answered two key questions 
regarding the status of organizations that wish to avoid the VAT tax that many EU countries 
assess on goods and services.77  First, the ECJ stated that it is the organization, not the individual 
services, that is the beneficiary and source of the VAT tax exemption.78  Second, the ECJ held 
                                                 
73 Inequality and Taxes: Equality Doesn’t Always Mean Redistribution, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2011, 
8:39PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/12/inequality-and-taxes.  
74 Tax Policy: The VAT of the Land, THE ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/05/tax-policy.  
75 Id. 
76 The Pros and Cons of VAT: A Last Resort, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/14903016; Tax Policy: The VAT of the Land, THE ECONOMIST (May 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/05/tax-policy.  
77 Case C-174/00, Kennemer Golf v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, [2002] ECR I-3293, at ¶ 15. 
78 Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. 
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that organizations can still fall under the protection of Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC even 
if the organization attempts to develop budgetary surpluses (i.e., “profits”) each year on the 
services that they provide, so long as the proceeds are not distributed to members and the 
proceeds are reinvested towards the organization’s mission.79  In reaching this conclusion, the 
ECJ was able to simply distinguish between profitable gain for members versus profitable gain 
used “to pay for the maintenance of, and the future improvements to, the facilities.”80 
 What made the case at bar most interesting is that the Dutch tax authority believed that it 
could separate the services rendered by the organization from the overall organization because 
the latter did indeed possess positive revenues each year largely from membership dues and 
admission fees that it charged to its members, and it owned physical facilities that included a golf 
course and clubhouse.81 
 
 B. Language and Uniformity    
  
In a case similar to Kennemer Golf, the ECJ was asked in Institute of the Motor Industry 
v. Commissioners to determine the proper purpose of tax exempt organizations under Article 13 
of Directive 77/388/EEC.82  The Institute of the Motor Industry was a voluntary-member trade 
union which had as its primary purposes to improve the standards of its members at work, 
improve career structures for its members, and enhance the public perception of the industry and 
the people working in the industry.83  The Institute also validated courses offered by other 
organizations that promoted the necessary skills for the workers within the motor industry and 
keeping its members informed about skill changes across the industry.84  Similar to the condition 
in Kennemer Golf , the Institute charged a membership fee to its members.85 
 The British tax authority denied the Institute VAT tax-exempt status because the former 
believed that the latter was not an organization included within Article 13, based on the English 
language use of the term “trade union.”86  However, although the ECJ acknowledged that 
linguistic differences can cause problems in regard to EU law interpretation, the ECJ made it 
clear that one language’s version is never the “sole basis for the interpretation of that provision” 
and that in order to achieve uniformity in EU law, the general purpose of the provision must be 
examined.87  The ECJ also stated that the aim of Directive 77/388/EEC, at least in part, is to 
exempt activities in the public interest from the VAT tax.88  Further, the ECJ held that if the main 
                                                 
79 Id. at ¶ 28. 
80 Id. at ¶¶ 26, 28. 
81 Id. at ¶¶ 9-10, 13. 
82 Case C-149/97, Inst. of the Motor Indus. v. Comm’rs, [1998] ECR I-7053. 
83 Id. at ¶ 12. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at ¶ 5. 
86 Id. at ¶¶ 7-8, 9-12. 
87 Id. at ¶ 16. 
88 Id. at ¶ 18. 
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purpose of an organization is to represent the collective interests of its members, such a purpose 
falls within the confines of Article 13’s public interest requirement.89 
 
 C. Federalism 
  
Virtually all federal systems of government, and specifically the levels of those federal 
governments, will have disagreements concerning each level’s sphere of influence.  In Swedish 
State v. Stockholm Lindopark, the ECJ held that the Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC prohibits 
national governments from creating their own VAT tax exemption laws.90  Here, the ECJ heard 
an argument from plaintiff Stockholm Lindopark, an operator of athletic facilities, that Sweden 
must follow the EU Directive regarding nonprofit organizations and should have the power to 
craft a more limited rule on tax exemption for such organizations.91  In addition to holding that 
the Swedish government is bound by a federalist EU Directive, the ECJ also found that a 
nonprofit organization could sue the national government for back taxes paid pursuant to the 
national law.92 
 The ECJ upheld similar federalist principles in Commission v. Spain.93  Specifically in 
the case at bar, the Spanish government argued that language in Article 13 of Directive 
77/388/EEC allowed national governments to limit the application of VAT tax-exempt status.94  
Pursuant to a 1992 law, the Spanish government had enacted a law that limited the amount in 
membership fees that a nonprofit organization could charge and still benefit from VAT tax 
exemption.95  In deciding that the Sixth Council Directive does not allow a member-state to place 
limitations on VAT tax exempt status, the ECJ reasoned that some truly nonprofit organizations 
would lose the exemption merely because of their memberships and not because of their mission 
and, likewise, for-profit organizations may be able to take advantage of the Spanish law by 
keeping their membership fees lower.96 
 
 D. Relations Between Organizations 
  
In SUFA v. Staatssecretaris van Fiinancien, the ECJ dealt with the sticky issue of VAT 
tax application to services provided by one nonprofit organization to another nonprofit 
organization.97  Here, the question was whether a nonprofit organization was entitled to a VAT 
                                                 
89 Id. at ¶ 21. 
90 Case C-150/99, Swedish State v. Stockholm Lindopark [2001] ECR I-493, at ¶ 23. 
91 Id. at ¶¶ 12-12, 19. 
92 Id. at ¶¶ 35-36. 
93 Case C-124/96, Comm’n v. Spain, [1998] ECR I-2501. 
94 Id. at ¶¶ 14-16. 
95 Id. at ¶ 3. 
96 Id. at ¶ 17. 
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tax exemption when it provides services to a second nonprofit organization and that latter 
organization acts to render services for its members.98  In response, the ECJ held that a nonprofit 
organization that supplies services to another organization is not exempt under Article 13 of 
Directive 77/388/EEC.99  The ECJs justification rested on its interpretation of the Directive that a 
VAT tax exemption requires a showing that the organization is acting on behalf of its members 
and is doing so independently.100   
 
 E. Form of Business Association and Location of Services  
 
 The ECJ ruled in Gregg v. Commissioners that although a partnership may not have a 
legal personality under national law (here, Northern Ireland), the operators of a nursing home are 
entitled to a VAT tax exemption under Article 13 of Directive 77/388/EEC.101  In Gregg, the 
United Kingdom tax authority was not willing to extend VAT tax exemptions to a partnership 
operated by a married couple that offered nursing home services to patients, interpreting pursuant 
to UK law that a partnership was not eligible for a VAT tax exemption reserved only for 
“institutions.”102  Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC extends a VAT tax 
exemption to hospitals, medical treatment centers, similar establishments, organizations, and 
other entities that engage in medical care activities governed by public law as well as the supply 
of goods and services linked to social security and welfare.103  UK law, pursuant to its Value 
Added Tax Law of 1994, extended the same VAT tax exemption to “hospitals” and 
“institutions.”104 
 The ECJ began its opinion by stating that the language within the Sixth Council Directive 
must be narrowly interpreted so as not to allow the various VAT tax exceptions to exist because 
the general principle behind the EU’s VAT tax scheme requires that all services be subject to the 
VAT tax.105  The ECJ believed that the various terms identified in both Directive 77/388/EEC 
and the UK Value Added Tax Law of 1994 were broad enough to include the activities of the 
plaintiffs’ partnership, that the focus as to whether the EU’s VAT tax system should apply must 
be on the activities delivered, and that the EU legislature did not intend to limit the application of 
the VAT tax based on the form of business association.106  Furthermore, and relatedly, the ECJ 
believed that the principle of fiscal neutrality requires that all providers of similar services should 
be treated the same regardless of the form of the business association.107 
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 The ECJ similarly held that pursuant to Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC, a national government cannot condition the VAT tax exemption on the form of 
business association for which the organization is created.108  Additionally, the ECJ has held that 
the tax exemption for medical services cannot be conditioned upon the location of the services 
and instead requires that the services, medical or therapeutic, be rendered to those in need of 
public welfare.109  In Ambulater, the German government contended that a limited liability 
company was not entitled to the VAT tax exemption because it was organized as such and that it 
provided medical services on an outpatient basis, often in a patient’s home.110  Once again, the 
ECJ stated that the principle of fiscal neutrality prohibits member-states from implementing 
national law that treats economic operators of the same services differently, and the delivery of 
medical services is no different.111  However, the ECJ went further and commented that its case 
law has been consistent in commanding that VAT tax exemptions must be dedicated to creating a 
common system of VAT tax espoused by Directive 77/388/EEC.112  According to the ECJ, in 
order to be eligible for the VAT tax exemption pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC, a particular 
business association is not required but rather only that medical services are rendered by a person 
or persons with the requisite professional qualifications.113  Furthermore, the ECJ extended the 
scope of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC to apply to general care and domestic help 
through outpatient services under Article 13’s category of “supply of services,” which are linked 
to welfare and social security, and more importantly, gave notice to economic actors that they 
can rely on Article 13’s provisions to combat national law not in conformity with this 
principle.114 
 
 F. Additional Taxes Implemented by Member-States 
 
 In GIL Insurance Ltd and Others v. Commissioners, the ECJ made it clear that a VAT tax 
can legally be separated from other taxes, duties, and charges issued by a member-state based 
one of the characteristics that a VAT tax must contain, including that the VAT applies generally 
to transactions relating to goods or services; the levy is proportional to the value of the goods or 
services and the volume of transactions for which the levy applies; the levy is charged at each 
stage of production; and the levy is applied to the added value of the goods and services.115  The 
plaintiffs, including GIL Insurance and other insurance providers, contended that the United 
Kingdom’s special taxation system for domestic appliances, motor cars, and travel services 
violated Articles 33 and 27 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC because the Sixth Council 
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Directive requires member-states to get permission from the EU Council to impose a higher rate 
of VAT on insurance contracts and the United Kingdom’s Insurance Premium Tax (“IPT”) was 
not a VAT tax in that it did not apply generally to all goods and services.116 
 The United Kingdom’s IPT (implemented in 1994) applied a tax rate of 2.5% on the 
receipt of insurance premiums by an entity providing insurance services but was supplemented in 
1997 by a new rate of 4.0% and a higher rate of 17.5% on insurance premiums associated with 
motor cars, domestic appliances (when the insurance is sold by an entity associated with the 
supplier of the appliance), and travel services (travel insurance sold through travel agents) 
applied at the same time the VAT tax was applied.117  The British government, in an attempt to 
change consumer behavior through its taxation system and raise revenue, contended that the IPT 
was enacted in order to assess all insurance contracts at the same, lower rate of 2.5% (then 
4.0%), which was lower than the 17.5% VAT tax rate on contracts for the repair and 
maintenance of appliances sold or rented (which was also exempted), with the end goal of 
getting consumers to purchase traditional insurance from traditional insurers and thus pay the 
non-exempted 4.0% on the insurance contract.118  However, the IPT was not successful. Thus, 
the British government moved the IPT to the VAT rate and applied it only to certain types of 
insurance contracts and associated insurance transactions involving domestic appliances, motor 
cars, and travel services, with the belief that suppliers of these products could easily manipulate 
prices of the appliances and the associated insurance contracts.119 
 Three key provisions of the Sixth Council Directive were important in the case at bar.  
Article 33 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows member-states to put forth taxes on 
insurance contracts so long as these taxes are not turnover taxes and so long as those imposed 
taxes do not interfere with trade between and among member-states.120  Article 27 of the Sixth 
Council Directive allows the EU Council to grant permission to a member-state to introduce 
special tax measures that otherwise would interfere with the general intent of the Sixth Council 
Directive in order to prevent tax evasion or tax avoidance so long as those special tax measures 
do not affect the total amount of tax due at the final consumption stage.121  Lastly, Article 13 of 
the Sixth Council Directive provides for a general exemption of VAT taxes pursuant to insurance 
and reinsurance transactions and related services conducted by insurance brokers and agents.122 
 On the question of whether a member-state can introduce a levy on insurance premiums 
that looks like a VAT tax but is not considered to be a VAT tax by that member-state’s 
government, the ECJ found the United Kingdom’s IPT did not violate Article 33 of Directive 
77/388/EEC.123  The plaintiffs contended that the higher rate IPT was a special tax charged on 
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insurance services and constituted a turnover tax prohibited by Article 33 since the tax met many 
of the criteria for a VAT tax but did not apply to all economic transactions.124  Contrary to this 
position, the ECJ stated that member-states are able to impose taxes that do not meet one or all of 
the main characteristics of a traditional VAT tax, including the levy which is not a VAT tax not 
reaching all economic transactions.125  The ECJ also believed that the IPT was allowed by 
Article 33 despite the fact that it did not match the VAT tax because it was not assessed at each 
point of production and distribution, only assessed at the conclusion of the insurance contract 
and did not apply to the added value of the services.126 
 The ECJ next addressed whether Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 
77/388/EEC prohibits a member-state’s implementation of a levy on insurance premiums at a 
special rate, yet identical to the VAT tax rate, without seeking prior approval from the EU 
Council.127  The plaintiffs asserted that the United Kingdom government was obliged to seek 
permission from the EU Council to impose a higher IPT on an insurance contract with the goal 
of limiting tax avoidance.128  The United Kingdom countered that interested parties such as the 
plaintiffs should have realized that member-states had the authority to impose a higher rate of 
taxation on insurance contracts pursuant to Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive in order to 
compensate for losses due to Article 13’s provision for exemption of VAT on insurance 
premiums.129  The ECJ agreed with the United Kingdom’s position, holding that Article 27 of the 
Sixth Council Directive should be interpreted as to allow a member-state to impose a higher rate 
of taxation, separate from the VAT tax, without having to make a separate request to the EU 
Council to do so; and thus member-states can impose different tax rates on insurance contracts 
freely. The ECJ also held that the IPT was not a turnover tax as prohibited by Article 33.130 
 The ECJ gave member-states freedom to levy taxes on transactions subject to the VAT 
tax so long as the taxes cannot be deemed turnover taxes.131  In Kerrutt v. Finanzamt, a German 
couple was ordered to pay taxes on a series of contracts that included the purchase of the grounds 
for a new apartment building, as well as the for the construction of the building, the supervision 
of the construction, documentation expenses, finance procurement, and general management.132  
Specifically, the Kerrutts claimed that although the contractual provisions for the supply of 
building materials would be subject to the VAT tax, the contractual provisions for the land 
acquisition should be exempt under Directive 77/388/EEC, which prohibits double taxation by a 
member-state through the imposition of transfer taxes or VAT taxes on the same transaction 
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because in their opinion the entire group of activities amounted to one transaction.133  In contrast 
to the position of the Kerrutts, the German government and the EU Commission contended that 
the individual activities the couple engaged in amounted to several, individual transactions 
instead of just one transaction that would be exempt pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC since 
none of the activities qualified for an exemption.134   
 The ECJ held that no provision of EU law, including Directive 77/388/EEC, prohibits a 
member-state from maintaining a tax regime that allows for a transaction to be taxed through a 
VAT tax and any other tax so long as the latter tax is not a turnover tax, even if the transaction is 
subject to what would otherwise constitute double taxation.135  Making the ending jurisprudence 
easier for the ECJ was its answer to the first question. The ECJ answered affirmatively whether 
the contract for the purchase of goods and services supporting a building’s construction was 
subject to the VAT tax.136  However, the ECJ did state that the actual purchase of the property on 
which the building would be placed was not subject to the VAT tax.137 
 Although the ECJ recognized the need for tax harmonization across the EU, while 
agreeing with the German government and the European Commission, the ECJ could not find 
any prohibition or limitation on a member-state’s desire to tax the transaction in the case at bar 
anywhere in EU law and thus EU law does allow for a concurrent taxation system.138 
 
 G. Method of VAT Tax Refunds 
 
 The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC was amended by Directive 95/7/EC with the 
intent of simplifying the implementation of measures associated with the VAT tax.139  Articles 
17 and 18 of Directive 77/388/EEC, collectively, require member-states to allow taxable persons 
to deduct immediately from their VAT liability, as appropriate, when the deduction amount 
exceeds the amount of the tax due.140  Also, according to Articles 17 and 18, the member-state 
can either issue a refund or allow the taxable person to carry the excess forward to the next 
taxing period.141  If the potential amount of the deduction is insignificant, the member-state need 
not allow for a refund or a carry forward.142  Italian law, however, provided that the Italian 
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government, in lieu of a refund or a carry-forward provision, would issue a bond in the amount 
of the deduction to the taxable person.143   
 The EU Commission issued a complaint against Italy contending that the Italian policy 
on refundable VAT taxes was in violation of Directive 77/388/EEC.144  According to the EU 
Commission, the Directive provided for a taxable party’s right to deduct the excess VAT tax it 
has paid and mandated that member-state governments to make the refunds immediate.145  The 
EU Commission further reasoned that the taxable entities may need access to those funds as part 
of their working capital and, if ordered to hold government bonds, may need to access a loan 
from a bank that may charge a higher rate of interest than what is paid on the government 
bond.146 
 The ECJ found that the Italian government’s policy was in violation of Directive 
77/388/EEC, and in doing so, rejected several arguments put forth by Italy as it attempted to 
provide justification for forcing taxable persons to accept bonds in lieu of an immediate refund 
and/or allowing for the excess VAT taxes to carry forward.147  First, and perhaps most 
importantly, the ECJ held that the VAT taxation system was common and that all taxable persons 
across all member-states in the EU should be held to the same standards and benefits, resulting in 
a neutral taxation system.148  Second, the ECJ stated the full credit owed to a taxable person must 
be the result of the member-state’s action, and the refund must be in liquid means or an 
equivalent form and must be realized in a reasonable period of time, during which the Italian 
bonds ran the risk of not being liquid, would not result in a reasonable time for the VAT tax 
deduction, and might not allow for a full recovery of the value of the deduction.149  Third, 
according to the ECJ, it did not matter that there were few firms that would actually hold the 
Italian bonds as part of its excess VAT tax deduction plan.150  Fourth, and certainly crucial to the 
functioning of the EU, the ECJ did not excuse the Italian government’s policy in light of the fact 
that Italy contended that it could not meet all of the obligations accrued by VAT tax refunds 
owed to taxable persons if the government were to strictly adhere to Directive 77/388/ECC.151 
 The ECJ has held, however, that the determination of whether a derogation is 
proportionate to a member-state’s stated needs regarding its VAT tax system is best left to a 
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national court.152  Regardless, in Molenheide v. Belgium, the ECJ did state that some member-
state legislation in the form of an attempted derogation from Directive 77/388/EEC, such as 
using a date different from the date when the retained VAT balance would have been otherwise 
paid to calculate the appropriate amount of interest, would not be proportionate to a member-
state’s interest.153  Regardless, the ECJ left it for the national courts to determine whether 
Belgium’s VAT tax withholding regulation, employed to prevent tax evasion and dubbed 
“preventive attachment,” was acceptable given that Directive 77/388/EEC requires member-
states to either refund eligible VAT tax funds or to carry the refund amount forward to the next 
year.154  Pursuant to the Belgian legislation, the Belgian government could engage in a 
preventive attachment proceeding which withholds potentially refundable VAT taxes to taxable 
persons upon the presentment of an official report containing a presumption or evidence of 
ineligibility for a refund and serving the official report to the taxable person.155  The retained 
VAT tax funds would remain retained until the presumption or evidence was refuted.156  The 
taxable person could only attack the preventive attachment in court but the court itself could not 
order the release of funds until the presumption or evidence was refuted.157 
 In all four of the cases consolidated by the ECJ, the Belgian government articulated 
grounds for maintaining a preventive attachment of VAT tax funds that the plaintiffs (taxable 
persons) argued should have been refunded to them.158  Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that 
Directive 77/388/EEC only allowed a member-state to either refund the VAT tax funds to be 
deducted and carried forward and thus the Directive did not allow a member-state to engage in 
“preventive attachment” procedure.159 
In Molenheide, the ECJ gave perhaps its best articulation of the provision of the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC, requiring a uniform VAT tax system and harmonization of VAT 
tax throughout the EU.  The ECJ stated that the Sixth Council Directive was designed to 
harmonize the rules across the member-states on the subject of allowable deductions.160  The 
ECJ then stated that although Directive 77/388/EEC does not expressly prohibit the preventive 
attachment method, a member-state must still show that this method of ensuring tax compliance 
is proportional.161  Proportionality, according to the ECJ, means that although a member-state 
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may impose regulations designed to protect its finances, the regulations cannot undermine the 
EU requirement that there exist a common VAT tax system or fundamental requirement of that 
common VAT tax system, which is the right to deduct VAT tax when appropriate.162 
 Of chief importance while arguing that the preventive attachment method was 
disproportionate and thus a violation of Directive 77/388/EEC, the plaintiffs stated that the 
Belgian preventive attachment system was absolute whenever a VAT tax dispute occurred and 
because compulsory, there was an irrebuttable presumption that goes much further than 
necessary to ensure tax compliance.163  The ECJ agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the 
Belgian system created an irrebuttable presumption in favor of the government that, in turn, also 
denied taxable persons seeking a VAT tax reduction a denial of judicial review and together such 
a system would be disproportionate to Belgium’s interests in maintaining a VAT tax system free 
from tax evasion.164  Likewise, the ECJ agreed with the plaintiffs that use of a date, other than 
that on which the VAT tax refund was due, to calculate interest the Belgian government would 
have to pay on funds subject to a preventive attachment is disproportionate as measured against 
the goal of maintaining an effective VAT tax system.165 
 
 H. Additional Administrative Requirements 
 
 Article 11 of Directive 77/388/EEC is designed to foster the harmonization of VAT taxes 
throughout the EU by fixing the taxable amount of VAT.166  Article 27, however, allows 
member-states to engage in derogations of that fixed amount founded in Article 11 when 
attempting to simplify procedures for charging VAT taxes.167  In Commission v. Belgium, the 
ECJ found Belgium’s derogations, which allowed for variations of the VAT tax based on the age 
of the car at the time of sale, the use of the car, and the difference between the catalog price and 
the stated minimum price, to violate the tenets of Directive 77/388/EEC.168 
 Belgian law stated that, generally, cars sold in or imported into Belgium were to be 
assessed a VAT tax not lower than the catalog price, but when the car has been used by a 
manufacturer or dealer for the manufacturer’s or dealer’s own use (an “appropriated car”), the 
VAT tax charged would be only the catalog price assessed to a new car if the car was sold within 
six months.169  If the appropriated car was sold between six months and eighteen months, the 
VAT tax assessed would be equal to the amount of the difference between the catalog price and 
the sale price.170  Lastly, if the appropriated car was sold later than eighteen months, the VAT tax 
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charged would be based on the purchase price or the cost price of a similar, new version of the 
appropriated car.171  Belgian law also identified the catalog price of a car to be freely fixed by a 
manufacturer for a car sold in Belgium but set by an authorized agent if the car was sold outside 
of Belgium.172 
 In bringing the complaint, the EU Commission contended that the derogations Belgium 
had made for appropriated cars was not acceptable within the scope of Article 27 of Directive 
77/388/EEC because the derogations were too general in character and potentially harm the 
uniformity set in Article 11, which requires a fixed, taxable amount of VAT assessed to goods 
and services.173  Also, the EU Commission did not find legitimacy in Belgium’s argument that 
the derogations were needed to combat tax evasion or simplify the VAT tax system and that 
Belgium could implement less coercive measures.174   
 In contrast, Belgium argued that Article 27’s derogations provisions do not set limits on 
member-states’ ability to set such exceptions and the only real limitation is that a member-state’s 
derogations cannot affect the amount of tax charged at the final consumption stage.175  
Additionally, Belgium contended that its set of derogations was not disproportionate to its aims 
of curbing tax evasion in the auto sales sector through several acts such as false declarations of 
new car prices, part-exchanges associated with used cars, and the unpaid input taxes deducted by 
buyers.176 
 The ECJ did not find merit in Belgium’s derogations.  Specifically, the ECJ found the use 
of Belgian catalog prices to be a real threat to price standardization and that the derogations from 
Article 11 were not needed to prevent tax evasion and thus were disproportionate to the goals of 
the member-state.177  The ECJ further stated that Belgium breached Article 11 of Directive 
77/388/EEC for the VAT tax assessment of both domestically-produced and imported cars.178 
 Despite the flexibility afforded member-states pursuant to Directive 77/388/EEC, 
member-states cannot put forth additional requirements that make the right to deduct VAT taxes 
either practically impossible or excessively difficult.179  In EGI v. Belgium, the ECJ held that 
although it is within the member-state’s authority under Directive 77/388/EEC to require taxable 
parties to hold an invoice of particulars associated with sold goods, any additional information 
required by a member-state must be limited to what is required for that member-state to ensure 
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the accuracy in the levied VAT and supervision of the VAT system.180  Directive 77/388/EEC 
requires only that, in order to gain the deduction of VAT payable or already paid, the taxable 
party must hold an invoice reflecting the price of the good(s) exclusive of tax, the corresponding 
tax at each rate, and any exemptions.181  The Directive also allows member-states to determine 
which form of information would serve as an invoice or equivalent.182  According to Belgian 
law, those seeking a VAT tax deduction on the purchase of an automobile must not only possess 
the information required by Directive 77/388/EEC, but must also hold information on the type of 
vehicle, fittings, accessories, make, model, year, cylinder capacity, horsepower, bodywork 
model, chassis number, and the year of registration.183 
 In the first of two joined cases, the Belgian government denied Mrs. Jorion’s request for a 
refund of VAT tax on cars based on the Belgian government’s belief that too many irregularities 
existed in the proffered paperwork, including that the serial number on the car was omitted, 
deleted VAT tax numbers were used, different signatures appeared throughout the documents, 
and some fictitious addresses were found.184  In the second case, the Belgian government was 
demanding repayment of deducted VAT taxes due to a lack of VAT tax registration numbers of 
suppliers, the absence of a date on which the goods were supplied and services completed, and 
an inadequate description.185 
 According to the ECJ, Directive 77/388/EEC only requires that a required invoice contain 
enough information allowing a member-state government to determine whether it will permit a 
deduction of VAT taxes.186  However, although the ECJ stated that it is for a member-state’s 
national court to determine as such, when the additional sources of information required by a 
member-state exceed what is necessary to determine whether VAT taxes can be deducted, that 
member-state violates the Directive.187   
 In Ampliscientifica Srl v. Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze, the ECJ stated that 
the well-established principles of fiscal neutrality, prohibition of the abuse of rights, and the 
principle of proportionality as they apply to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC do not limit 
a member-state’s ability to put in place a requirement that parent firms hold 50% of a 
subsidiary’s share capital or stock at the beginning of the tax year, by which the parent company 
declares a significant tie between it and the subsidiary in order to simplify its VAT tax 
assessment under that member-state’s law.188  Article 4 of the Sixth Council Directive states that 
a “taxable person” is a person who independently carries on an economic activity and, subject to 
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Article 29 of the Sixth Council Directive, allows member-states to treat several taxable persons 
as one taxable person for VAT tax purposes if those persons are closely tied together through 
financial means, economic means, and/or organizational means.189  Article 27(1) states that the 
EU Council can allow a member-state a derogation when the member-state is attempting to 
simplify the procedure for charging tax and/or prevent tax evasion so long as the taxable amount 
due is realized at the final consumption stage.190 
 Pursuant to the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, the Italian government enacted a 
law allowing parent firms to add their subsidiaries to create one taxable entity, and the parent 
firm could declare that subsidiary so long as both the parent and subsidiary were located within 
the same jurisdiction and the parent owns at least 50% of the shares of the subsidiary at the 
beginning of the calendar year.191  Also, according to the Italian law, the parent would have to be 
able to act on behalf of the subsidiary, and the parent must claim the VAT tax number of the 
subsidiary or subsidiaries as its own.192  In Ampliscientifica, both the Ampliscientifica and 
Amplifin firms were subsidiaries of the parent Amplifon firm whereby more than 50% of the 
shares of Ampliscientifica were owned by Amplifon, and 99% of the shares of Amplifin were 
owned by Amplifon.193  When Amplifin was deemed ineligible to make the declaration that 
Ampliscientifica was a subsidiary for VAT tax purposes, the firm objected and petitioned the 
Italian courts, which in turn sent the case to the ECJ for clarification.194 
 The ECJ made three very important statements about the ability of a member-state to 
create a derogation that would comply with the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.  First, 
concerning the principle of fiscal neutrality, member-states must make sure they do not treat 
similar goods that are in competition with each other differently within their VAT tax regime.195  
More narrowly, the ECJ stated that the Italian government’s requirements for blending a parent 
and a subsidiary together for VAT tax purposes does not violate the principle of fiscal neutrality 
in that the Italian law is merely making compliance with the VAT tax system easier regarding 
payment procedures.196  Second, the ECJ clarified that the abuse-of-rights principle was designed 
to make sure that EU law, especially in regard to the EU-wide VAT tax regime, was not used to 
cover abusive practices by taxable persons but could be used to prohibit artificial arrangements 
and thus the Italian law requiring a full-tax year relationship between the parent and the 
subsidiary which do not reflect economic reality and are designed only to gain a tax 
advantage.197  Directly, the ECJ stated that the Italian law was a valid means to combat tax 
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evasion, avoidance, or abuse, which is encouraged by the Sixth Council Directive.198  Third, on 
the subject of the principle of proportionality, the ECJ accepted the yearlong tax period as a 
condition that was not disproportionate to the objective set forth in the Italian law to attack tax 
evasion and “bogus legal arrangements.”199  In fact, the ECJ commented that an arrangement that 
was not at least a year in existence could lead to ad hoc legal relationships designed to merely 
defraud.200 
 
 I. Specific Use of Goods  
 
 According to the ECJ in Talacre Beach v. United Kingdom, a member-state may tax a 
good and contents within that good at separate VAT tax rates.201  Talacre Beach was a UK-based 
recreational vehicle sales firm specializing in the sale of caravans and the contents inside the 
caravan, which included dining tables, chairs, stools, beds, and floor coverings.202  Pursuant to 
UK tax law, the caravans were subject to a zero rate of VAT tax; however, the UK government 
believed that any sale of a caravan with the various contents identified above would be subject to 
a VAT tax on the contents even if the caravan itself was subject to a zero VAT tax rate.203  In 
contrast, Talacre Beach believed that the caravans and the contents therein constitute a single, 
indivisible sale, and since the caravans were subject to a zero VAT tax rate, the contents sold 
within the caravan should also be subject to a zero VAT tax rate.204  
 The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows a member-state to assess zero rates for 
some sales transactions, and those transactions are to be considered exemptions for purposes of 
the VAT tax.205  However, any such reduced rates adopted by a member-state must have been in 
place on January 1, 1991.206   
 The ECJ stated in its decision that there was nothing in EU law that prevented a member-
state from allowing one element of a good to be taxed at one rate (the caravan) and other 
elements to be taxed at other rates (the items within the caravan) in a way that would jeopardize 
the integrity of the EU-wide VAT tax system.207  The ECJ did acknowledge that much of the 
case law on the topic suggested that the single sale of an item or group of items as a whole 
should be taxed at one VAT tax rate, and that same case law did not completely prohibit the 
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items within the group in a single sale to be taxed at different rates within the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC.208 
 The ECJ provided one of its best evaluations of the ability to deduct from the VAT tax in 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Midland.209  In Midland, the ECJ explained that the 
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC maintains a deduction system that is designed to relieve a 
trader in goods and services of the burden of the VAT tax payable or previously paid in the 
course of the trader’s economic activities provided that those same activities are subject to the 
VAT tax.210  The ECJ additionally commented that Directive 77/388/EEC, specifically Article 17 
of the Sixth Council Directive, requires a direct and immediate link between the goods and 
services acquired by a trader and the transaction or transactions that follow, which are also 
subject to the VAT tax before a deduction can be earned.211  However, the ECJ also stated that 
the right to deduct from the VAT tax exists if the trader has been unable to use the goods or 
services that serve as inputs into a later transaction that is subject to the VAT tax and the 
inability to do so is beyond the control of the trader.212  Furthermore, the ECJ contended that an 
exception can be made in special circumstances to the general rule when a direct and immediate 
link between the goods and services the trader purchased and the later transaction giving rise to 
the ability to deduct cannot be established.213   
 The ECJ also answered a second question in Midland on the issue of whether a trader can 
deduct VAT tax in a later transaction for expenses related to the securing of goods and services 
that support the later transaction but where the later transaction was supported by those goods 
and services merely by consequence.214  According to the ECJ, the only way by which the trader 
could deduct from the VAT tax in that situation is if the trader can show by means of objective 
evidence that the expenses associated with acquiring the goods and services supported some of 
the components of the later transaction subject to the VAT tax.215  Similarly, the ECJ also stated 
that it should be the determination of the reviewing national court to find that cases whereby the 
purchased goods and services support some of the components of a later transaction subject to 
the VAT tax in a mere consequential manner.216 
 The facts of Midland are worth description.  Here, the United Kingdom tax authorities 
challenged the ability of the Midland firm to deduct legal expenses from stemming from a 
lawsuit that was related to an attempt to purchase a component of another firm.217  Although 
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Midland attempted to deduct the goods and services purchased (the legal services) to engage in 
the purchase of another firm, which is a transaction subject to the VAT tax and a deduction for 
goods and services purchased to support that transaction, the British government believed that 
the legal services were related to Midland’s business generally, specifically the lawsuit, and not 
to the attempt to purchase another firm.218  However, the British government did suggest that 
some, but not all of the legal services could be deducted from the VAT tax.219 
 Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive states that the right to deduct goods and services 
from the VAT tax occurs only when a later transaction gives rise to a VAT tax charge and allows 
for the deduction of VAT tax when the goods and services support a later transaction, when 
those same goods and services are consumed both in cases, and when the later transaction is 
exempt from the VAT tax and when not exempt from the VAT tax.220  However, Article 17 also 
allows for a proportional deduction from the VAT tax in cases where two or more later 
transactions giving rise to the VAT tax are supported by goods and services purchased by the 
trader, and only the goods and services purchased by the trader may be deducted that support the 
transaction or transactions that allow for a deduction.221 
 Although the ECJ would allow for deductions pursuant to Article 17 of the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC, the ECJ made it clear that the factual determinations should be left to 
national courts in cases where a direct and immediate link cannot be established between the 
trader’s purchased goods and services and the trader’s later transaction due to circumstances 
beyond the trader’s control, or where the goods and services support part of the later transactions 
that give rise to a VAT tax deduction.222 
 Article 2 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC states that the VAT tax is applicable 
to the sale of goods or services sold within a member-state by a taxable person while Article 5(1) 
of the Sixth Council Directive defines the sale of goods as the transfer of the right to dispose of 
tangible property as the owner.223  Article 5(8) of the Sixth Council Directive further provides 
that when the property is transferred to a new owner, in order to determine whether the sale 
includes a partial or a total transfer of assets, member-states may consider that no supply of 
goods has taken place and, when doing so, the recipient owner will be treated as a successor to 
the transferor. When appropriate, the member-state can also enact measures to prevent distortion 
of competition when that same successor is not wholly liable to pay taxes.224  Article 17(2) of the 
Sixth Council Directive provides that when goods are purchased for taxable transactions, the 
taxable person who is also the purchaser of those same goods is entitled to a VAT tax 
deduction.225 In Zita Modes Sarl v. Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines, the ECJ 
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held that member-states can determine that a sale of a business’s totality of assets to a successor 
taxable person includes no supply of goods for the purposes of the VAT tax, but when doing so, 
that member-state must only use such a determination in order to prevent distortion in 
competition.226 
 In Zita Modes, the plaintiff firm, Zita Modes, sold to another firm, Milady, a ready-to-
wear clothing business and the accompanying invoice claimed that the transaction was not 
subject to the VAT tax in Luxembourg.227  Pursuant to Luxembourg tax law, like Article 5(1) of 
the Sixth Council Directive, the supply of goods applies to the transfer of ownership rights 
whereby the successor may dispose of the tangible property as the owner, but also provided that 
the transfer of a totality of assets or partial assets is not to be deemed a supply of goods.228  
Following the sale of the ready-to-wear clothing business to Milady, a perfumery, the 
Luxembourg tax authorities notified Zita Modes that since Milady did not continue the business 
sold to it (ready-to-wear clothing), the Luxembourg tax law did not apply and thus no VAT tax 
deduction would be allowed pursuant to Article 17(2) of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 
77/388/EEC.229  Zita Modes countered that the Luxembourg tax law did not specifically state 
that the successor business had to maintain business operations, and since both the buyer and 
seller were taxable persons, there should be a full refund of the VAT tax.230 
 The ECJ made several important statements about the nature of such a transaction for 
VAT tax purposes, concluding that Article 5(8) of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 
77/388/EEC allows a member-state to determine that no supply of goods has taken place in a sale 
of a business between taxable persons, even if the totality of assets has been transferred.231 The 
ECJ also concluded that a member-state can require the buyer to continue the same business 
operations as the seller in order to be exempt from the VAT tax.232  First, when a member-state 
uses its discretion to determine that the no-supply-of-goods rule applies to a transaction between 
a seller and a buyer, the VAT tax is simply not applicable.233  Second, this discretion can only be 
used to favor a transferee of the sale in order to avoid the distortion of competition.234  The ECJ 
commented that these two requirements are founded in the purpose of the Sixth Council 
Directive, which is to make sure that the VAT tax system applies uniformly across the member-
states and prevents divergences in interpretation from member-state to member-state.235   
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 Third, the ECJ remarked that member-states must exercise their discretion pursuant to 
Article 5(8) in a way that simplifies the transfer of assets from a buyer to a seller in a way that 
also prevents the overburdening of the transferee’s assets, which, without the use of protective 
discretion, would otherwise bear the costs of the VAT tax.236  Fourth, the ECJ determined that 
member-states’ use of discretion when deciding whether no supply of goods has taken place in a 
sale of assets must apply to all transactions and not just certain transfers of assets.237  Fifth, the 
same discretion must also apply in cases where the buyer purchases the assets but does not have 
the member-state’s permission to engage in the same business as the seller.238  
 
 J. Member-State Discretion 
 
 In Jetair NV v. FOD Financien, five questions were posed to the ECJ regarding 
limitations on a member-state’s ability to charge VAT taxes on travel agent activities involving 
excursions outside the EU.239  The plaintiffs, Jetair and Travel4you, worked together to organize 
clients’ international travel, offering mainly air travel and hotel reservations, and when billed by 
the Belgian government for VAT taxes, claimed back a substantial amount in VAT taxes paid 
ahead.240  However, the Belgian government did not refund the entire amount of claimed back 
VAT taxes, forcing the commercial partners to litigate on the question of whether Belgian law, 
as amended in 1999, would allow the Belgian government to keep the withheld VAT taxes.241 
 Directive 77/388/EEC addresses the mission of tax harmonization and the plight of travel 
agents.  Article 1 of the Sixth Council Directive requires member-states to adopt the necessary 
domestic law to ensure equal treatment by January 1, 1978.242  Article 26 of the Sixth Council 
Directive states that EU member-states must apply the VAT tax to the activities of travel agents 
except when they are acting as intermediaries and not directly with their own clients.243  
Specifically, and narrowly, if a travel agent is working as an intermediary, the travel agent must 
be treated as such for taxation purposes.244  Problematically for the parties in the case at bar, the 
Sixth Council Directive also allowed member-states to continue to subject intermediaries to the 
VAT tax during a transitional period that began on January 1, 1978 and lasted another five 
years.245   
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 Directive 2006/112/EC (“the VAT Directive”) also required that member-states exempt 
the transactions conducted by intermediaries if such transactions are conducted outside the EU 
but allowed for the VAT tax to apply to travel agents engaged in activities inside the EU.246  
However, the VAT Directive did allow a member-state to continue to tax the activities of travel 
agents when acting as intermediaries, even when the activities are conducted outside the EU, as 
long as that same member-state taxed such activities before or on January 1, 1978.247 Prior to 
December 1, 1977, Belgian law exempted the activities of travel agents acting as intermediaries 
when acting outside the EU, but the law was amended on that date so that the VAT tax would 
apply to such activities.248  Belgian law was again amended in 1999 and provided that travel 
agents could not be treated as intermediaries so that the VAT tax would apply to travel agents 
regardless of their activities and whether they were being conducted outside the EU.249 
 The ECJ first stated that neither Directive 77/388/EEC nor the VAT Directive prohibited 
Belgium from changing its law just before the January 1, 1978 date on which the tax 
harmonization legislation had to be adopted by member-states and thus travel agent activities 
that were focused on travel outside the EU could be subject to the VAT tax.250 The ECJ stated 
that, despite the midnight-hour nature of the change, the change would not seriously compromise 
the mission of tax harmonization.251  This rationale was adopted by the ECJ despite the fact that 
it cited its own precedent that member-states cannot engage in legal maneuvers that would risk 
the thrust of any EU law.252 
 The ECJ also held that the VAT Directive did not mandate that travel agents be treated as 
intermediaries when engaged in activities outside the EU for the purposes of taxation.253  
According to the ECJ, the VAT Directive actually gave member-states the option of taxing 
activities if the same member-state taxed the activity before January 1, 1978.254  Furthermore, the 
ECJ claimed that neither Belgian law nor the VAT Directive violated the broader tenets of EU 
law generally by allowing member-states to tax the activities of travel agents occurring outside 
the EU.255  Surprisingly, the ECJ contended that EU law tolerates differences among the 
member-states so long as the EU legislatures have not created a definitive system of their own on 
the subject matter, and the member-states maintain their existing legislation as Belgium had 
since December 1, 1977 and thus before January 1, 1978.256  The ECJ boldly stated that so long 
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as the Belgian government taxed the activity before January 1, 1978, Belgium has the right to 
choose whether to continue to tax that activity.257 
 Lastly, and certainly in a more constitutional fashion, the ECJ stated that Belgium does 
not violate the principles of equality, proportionality, and fiscal neutrality by treating travel 
agents and intermediaries differently for taxation purposes whereby the activities of travel 
agents, but not intermediaries, are subject to the VAT tax.258  According to the ECJ, the EU 
legislature contemplated this difference when drafting both Directive 77/388/EEC and the VAT 
Directive and found that travel agents and intermediaries do not act comparably.259  The ECJ 
contended that its own jurisprudence only requires similar treatment when such actors are acting 
in a similar fashion unless objective justification is found and precedent has been established that 
travel agents and intermediaries do not operate similarly.260 
 Anyone who engages in freelance activity of a professional nature should become 
familiar with the ECJ’s decision in Werner Haderer v. Finanzamt Wilmersdorf, in which the ECJ 
limited the ability of a national government to narrowly tailor for its own purposes the scope of 
Directive 77/388/EEC, holding that freelance university-level instructors must be exempted from 
the VAT tax pursuant to the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC.261  In Haderer, 
the German government contended that Mr. Haderer, a part-time instructor, must pay the VAT 
tax for his teaching activities at adult education institutes where he was paid by a subunit of the 
German federal government, the Land of Berlin, over a series of years.262  Mr. Haderer was paid 
an hourly rate, with contributions to his pension, health insurance, and a proportional leave 
allowance, only if his courses had sufficient enrollment; however, his total compensation did not 
include provisions for social security contributions, insurance, and taxes, all of which was 
spelled out in each six-month contract.263  
 The Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC specifically exempts from the VAT tax 
educational activities in support of children’s education, school or university education, 
vocational training and retraining, individual instruction given by teachers in a school or 
university setting, including the supply of services that are closely related to these activities.264  
German domestic law provided in regard to the VAT tax that freelance workers such as Mr. 
Haderer would not be exempt from paying the VAT tax if their activities amounted to individual 
instruction but did exempt the institutions that provide that instruction so long as the instructional 
activity is in the public interest or pursuant to the needs of a professional organization.265 
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 The ECJ first found that although Directive 77/388/EEC did have specific activities that 
are subject to the VAT tax exemption, there did exist some activities that would be included 
within the public interest category that are explicitly absent from the Directive.266  Furthermore, 
the ECJ contended that the provisions in Directive 77/388/EEC did allow for exemptions that 
would otherwise meet the intended effect of the Sixth Council Directive regarding either the 
activity or the economic agent performing those activities.267  The German government’s chief 
contention with the teaching duties of Mr. Haderer was that the instruction of pottery and 
ceramics courses were not at the same level of a traditional university course and thus should not 
be considered within the definitions of education, vocational training, or training, and instead 
were courses more so designed for leisure.268   
 Contrary to the German government’s position, the ECJ stated that creating divisions 
based on what constituted education, vocational training, or training under domestic law could 
not be tolerated since such divisions would risk the VAT tax system’s mission of uniformity 
across the EU member-states.269  Also, the ECJ commented that it was not necessary to create a 
common definition of what constitutes school or university education, but rather, it is incumbent 
upon member-states to make sure that the concept of school or university education is not limited 
to the traditional courses that end with examinations, qualifications, and/or professional or trade 
activity.270  According to the ECJ, the activities of Mr. Haderer were within the exemptions 
found in Directive 77/388/EEC merely because, although the lessons were mostly private, there 
was a link between his qualifications as a teacher and the content of the instruction.271  Further, 
the instruction provided by Mr. Haderer would be exempt from the VAT tax even if there was 
not a direct link between the students and the instructor.272  The ECJ also hinted that the 
employment relationship between Mr. Haderer and the Land of Berlin was that of a contractual 
relationship even as the employment contract signed by Mr. Haderer stated there was no 
contractual relationship.273 
 The ECJ made several pronouncements concerning the interpretation of the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC in Navicon SA v. Administracion del Estado to assist member-states in 
their quest to write accompanying legislation.274  In Navicon, the ECJ was asked to settle a 
debate between an international shipping firm, Navicon SA, and the Spanish government on 
whether an exemption on the VAT tax pursuant to Article 15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive of 
Directive 77/388/EEC could be limited to situations where an international shipper is chartering 
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a vessel’s entire cargo space and leaving a member-state with a final destination outside the 
EU.275   
 Pursuant to Article 15(5), VAT tax is to be exempted by member-states when goods are 
being exported to a location outside the EU by or on behalf of the vendor.276  However, 
according to Spanish legislation, such an exporting act whereby goods are being shipped to a 
location outside the EU, the act must include a full charting of the vessel in order to get the VAT 
tax exemption.277  The Spanish government denied Navicon SA’s request for a full VAT tax 
exemption because the goods in question did not occupy the entirety of the vessel and thus did 
not constitute a full chartering of the vessel.278  The Spanish courts, after receiving Navicon SA’s 
challenge, referred the question of whether a member-state could limit the VAT tax exemption to 
a full chartering of a vessel or, instead, whether a partial chartering of a vessel taking exported 
goods to a location outside of the EU could qualify for the VAT tax exemption under Article 
15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.279 
 First, while citing Articles 3(3) of the Sixth Council Directive and 22.1 of the more 
general VAT Law, the ECJ stated that goods being shipped from an EU member-state to another 
location outside of the EU, such as in this case from the Iberian Peninsula to the Canary Islands, 
would qualify as an export pursuant to the concept of a VAT tax.280  Second, according to the 
ECJ, these two provisions of EU law must be interpreted strictly to ensure that at least 
preliminarily all goods and services are subject to the VAT tax and, pursuant to the concept of 
fiscal neutrality, economic operators are treated the same when engaging in the same transaction 
in regard to the VAT tax.281  However, despite these two concerns, a strict interpretation of EU 
law cannot strip VAT tax exemptions from their intended effect.282  Third, since Article 15(5) of 
the Sixth Council Directive did not define the term “chartering,” as with any provision of EU 
law, the ECJ held itself accountable to examine the wording of the law, the context of the law, 
and the objective pursued by the law.283 
 These pronouncements made the remaining parts of the ECJ’s decision easier.  The ECJ 
held that the VAT tax exemption under Article 15(5) of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC 
should apply to exports delivered to a location outside the EU either by a full chartering of a 
vessel or a partial chartering of a vessel.284  The ECJ believed that Article 15(5) did not 
distinguish between “full chartering” and “partial chartering” concerning eligibility for the VAT 
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tax exemption nor did Article 22.1 of the more general VAT Law from which Article 15(5) of 
the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC is based.285  Although the ECJ contended 
that member-states are responsible for enacting domestic law to implement the Sixth Council 
Directive, any domestic law may not interfere with the subject matter of the exemptions 
presumed to apply by the EU government.286  The ECJ also addressed the larger scope of 
international business and stated that VAT tax exemptions are designed to make sure that goods 
are taxed at their destination and that the Spanish government’s requirement of full chartering 
would create a condition whereby goods shipped via a full chartering of a vessel would be taxed 
at the destination since the VAT tax exemption would apply at the point of shipment, yet goods 
delivered through a partial chartering would be taxed at the point of shipment since no VAT tax 
exemption would apply.287  Relatedly, the ECJ stated that the Spanish regulation, if upheld, 
would tie the taxation of exported goods to the size of a vessel so that large vessels carrying the 
goods of several exporters would face a point of departure VAT tax and exports carried on a 
small vessel, likely to be those of just one exporter, would be exempt from the VAT tax.288 
 
 K. Financial Transactions 
 
 Articles 5 and 6 of the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC address possible 
exemptions from the VAT tax for the sale of non-tangible interests in property.  Specifically, 
Article 5 allows member-states to label as tangible property shares or interests, providing the 
owner rights of ownership or possession over immovable property as a form of supply of goods, 
but also allows member-states to label the selling of those shares or interests as not amounting to 
a supply of goods.289  Article 6 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC mandates that a 
supply of services transaction must not be labeled a supply of goods transaction and a supply of 
goods transaction includes the sale of intangible property regardless of whether that intangible 
property establishes title rights.290  Article 13 of the same Directive excludes from the VAT tax 
the sale of shares or interests in firms and other securities provided that the sale does not include 
management and safekeeping of the firm or security.291 
 In Staatssecretaris van Financien v. X BV, the ECJ was asked to determine whether the 
sale of 30% of a firm’s shares to which the shares’ seller supplied services was exempt from the 
VAT tax despite the seller’s services not being exempt from the VAT tax.292  In the case at bar, 
the plaintiff, dubbed “X” by the ECJ, sold 30% of the shares dubbed “A” to another firm.293  
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However, at the time of the sale, X had been providing managerial services to A for an agreed-
upon remuneration, but the services ceased when X disposed of the shares and X left the 
managerial board at A as well.294  The Dutch government disagreed with X’s belief that the VAT 
taxes billed by the Dutch government pursuant to the sale of the shares in A should be 
refunded.295 
 Before getting to the more complicated question about whether X’s transaction was 
subject to the VAT tax regime, the ECJ first had to decide whether Articles 5 and 6 of the Sixth 
Council Directive must be read together as mandating that sale of a firm’s shares be considered a 
transfer of a totality of assets or services or rather a part thereof whereby the seller was also 
providing managerial services subject to the VAT tax.296  According to the ECJ, the purpose of 
the Sixth Council Directive was to make transfers of assets easier by guarding against the 
possibility that a transferor would be consumed by VAT taxes.297  The ECJ agreed with the 
German government’s contention that the totality of a transfer of assets can only occur if the firm 
is independent and engages in independent economic activity separate from the economic 
activity of the seller of the firm’s shares.298  The ECJ also stated that the mere selling of shares at 
the same time the assets of the firm are not sold does not constitute independent economic 
activity.299  Also, the transaction is not subject to the VAT tax when a member-state exercises its 
option to judge the transaction as one not involving the supply of goods when an owner transfers 
the totality of assets.300  The ECJ also found that the Dutch government had exercised this 
option.301 
 The ECJ found that the transfer of the shares in question here could not be considered the 
equivalent of the transfer of a totality of assets or a part thereof for the purposes of Article 5 of 
the Sixth Council Directive.302  Specific to X’s case, the ECJ stated that there were two separate 
transactions including the sale of the shares by X and the ceasing of managerial services by X.303  
Therefore, X’s right to deduct depends on whether the costs of the services provided by X as a 
consultant relating to the sale of the shares are costs related to the firm’s overall economic 
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activity yet separate from the selling price for those shares.304  However, the ECJ left it up to the 
Dutch national courts to determine whether this reality existed in X’s case.305 
 In Regie dauphinoise – Cabinet A. Forest SARL v. Ministre du Budget, the ECJ went to 
great lengths to tie many provisions of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC together to 
determine whether property managers can deduct interest payments they receive on their clients’ 
funds entrusted to them from the VAT tax.306  According to the ECJ, Article 2 of the Sixth 
Council Directive defines the scope of the EU’s VAT tax system, providing that only activities 
that are economic in nature are subject to the VAT tax, and makes clear that a taxable person 
must be acting within the scope of an economic activity in order for the VAT tax to apply.307  
Article 4(1) states that a taxable person includes a person who independently engages in an 
economic activity while Article 4(2) includes activities of producers, traders, service suppliers, 
exploiters of tangible and intangible property for the purposes of obtaining income on a 
continuing basis within the definition of economic activities.308   
 Article 17 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC generally governs the right to 
deduct from the VAT tax assessment, allows only a deduction when the taxable person when the 
goods and services in question are used for the purposes of the taxable transactions, and provides 
that only such a proportion of the VAT tax can be deducted that is attributable to VAT tax-
eligible activities when a taxable transaction includes both VAT tax-eligible components and 
non-VAT tax eligible components.309  Article 13 of the Sixth Council Directive requires 
member-states to exempt from the VAT tax not only transactions that involve the granting, 
negotiation, and management of credit, but also transactions that include the negotiation of 
deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, checks, and other negotiable 
instruments.310  Article 19 of the Sixth Council Directive provides that turnover amounts 
attributable to the supply of goods and services used by the taxable person for the purposes of the 
business cannot be excluded from the VAT tax.311 
 In the case at bar, Regie, a property management firm, was told by the French tax 
authority that it could only take a pro-rated deduction on its VAT tax assessment since the 
transactions it had engaged in on behalf of its clients were exempt from French tax law.312  More 
specifically, Regie, as part of its general management of leased and owned property of its clients, 
would take payments from co-owners and lessees of these properties and invest the funds on 
Regie’s own account so that Regie would gain the interest on those principal funds, which 
                                                 
304 Id. at ¶ 56. 
305 Id. at ¶ 57. 
306 Case C-306/94, Regie Dauphinoise – Cabinet A. Forest SARL v. Ministre du Budget, [1996] ECR I-
3695, at ¶¶ 13, 15. 
307 Id. at ¶ 15. 
308 Id. 
309 Id. at ¶ 3. 
310 Id. at ¶ 5. 
311 Id. at ¶ 4. 
312 Id. at ¶ 9. 
109  VOL. 7 (2018) 
 
averaged 14%, and then repay the principal funds to the clients.313  The French tax authority 
determined that the turnover amounts corresponding to the investment transactions Regie had 
made on behalf of its clients could not be deducted from the VAT tax assessment as “incidental 
financial transactions,” which Regie contested.314 
 The ECJ held that a member-state can prohibit a deduction for interest received on sums 
received from clients from a VAT tax assessment as an incidental financial transaction. The ECJ 
found a critical difference between merely holding sums on behalf of clients and actively 
investing those sums on behalf of clients.315  More narrowly, the ECJ admitted that services 
including the mere holding of funds submitted to a bank or property manager would not be 
subject to a VAT tax assessment, but this case was different because Regie not only collected the 
funds from lessees and co-owners, but also received the funds as a part of their general business 
and then invested the funds as a taxable person engaged in a taxable activity.316  According to the 
ECJ, the purpose behind allowing a deduction from a VAT tax assessment for incidental 
financial transactions within the scope of Article 19 of the Sixth Council Directive is to meet the 
objective of complete neutrality within the EU’s VAT tax system, especially in a case where the 
receipts from those transactions would wind up being VAT tax-assessed and the associated 
activities did not entail the goods or services subject to the VAT tax.317  The ECJ saw Regie’s 
activities differently because it had the consent of its clients to place the funds into Regie’s own 
accounts for investment, and such an activity constituted a “direct, permanent and necessary 
extension” of a taxable activity performed by a taxable person--here, a property management 
firm--and thus such an activity could in no way be characterized as an incidental financial 
management transaction.318 
 
 L. Tax Evasion 
 
 In Finanzampt Bergisch Gladbach v. Skripalle, the ECJ wrestled with the question of 
whether two provisions of Directive 77/388/EEC are compatible.319  Article 11 of the Directive 
77/388/EEC provides that concerning supplies of goods and services, the entire costs incurred by 
the supplier constitutes the consideration that the purchaser must acknowledge upon sale.320  
Article 27 of the same directive allows the EU Council to allow member-states to enact 
derogations from Directive 77/388/EEC in order to simplify the method or process of taxation or 
to prevent tax evasion.321  Specifically, the question posed to the ECJ was whether Article 27 of 
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Directive 77/388/EEC allowed for derogations by member-states to prevent tax evasion in the 
case of supplies for consideration between associations pursuant to Article 11 of the same 
Directive.322  If the two Articles of Directive 77/388/EEC are compatible, it is possible for the 
minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax to be greater than the market rate yet no tax evasion 
would occur in a transaction.323  
 In the case at bar, Germany’s VAT tax law stated that such tax was determined by a 
function of consideration, which included everything the purchaser of the supplies spends to 
acquire the supplies after the turnover tax has been deducted.324  The German government, 
however, adopted a derogation from German law by adopting a policy that in the case of supplies 
for one’s own consumption, the cost of the supplies would be the controlling factor in 
determining the turnover tax, which the German government considered a “notional minimum 
basis of assessment.”325  Skripalle challenged the German government’s assessment of the VAT 
tax on his rental property. The German government believed the minimum basis of assessment to 
be higher than the rent Skripalle and his family members who operated the tenant firm had 
agreed to even though the the rent was at market value.326   
 Specifically, both Skirpalle and the EU Commission contended that Article 27 of 
Directive 77/388/EEC must be strictly interpreted only to account for tax evasion concerns, and 
cannot allow member-states to create changes associated with how the VAT is calculated as 
dictated in Article 11.327  Since according to the EU Commission and Skripalle the rent in 
question was at market rates, tax evasion could not be an issue and thus the German policy of 
establishing a notional minimum basis was not necessary or permissible.328  Separately, Mr. 
Skripalle stated that the German law in question created a presumption that a rent agreement 
between family members is designed to avoid taxes.329  The German government, in contrast, 
stated that its notional minimum basis policy was necessary since very few situations were 
reflected by the facts in the case at bar, whereby the agreed-upon rent reflected the market rate 
and yet was below the notional minimum basis, which is appropriate to combat tax evasion.330 
 The ECJ opened the heart of its opinion by stating that there was no disagreement that the 
German government had engaged in a derogation by enacting its policy on maintaining a 
notional minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax. However, the ECJ further opined that any 
such derogations must be strictly construed and that although there is a risk that agreements 
between family members may pose a risk of tax evasion, there is no risk of tax evasion when, 
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objectively, the facts show that the involved parties have acted properly and especially in this 
case where the parties had agreed to a rent value that was in line with the marketplace.331  
According to the ECJ, the German policy on the VAT tax was not limited to concerns over tax 
evasion, strictly, as required by Article 27.332  The ECJ found this to be important since the 
German government had asked for the derogation to combat only tax evasion and not for the 
purpose of simplifying the taxation procedure.333  In the end, the ECJ found the German 
government’s use of a notional minimum basis for assessing the VAT tax on rent to be an 
unallowable derogation in the face of Directive 77/388/EEC.334 
 
 M. Shifting VAT Tax Liability 
 
 According to the ECJ in Staatssecretaris van Financien v. Pactor Vastgoed BV, pursuant 
to the Sixth Council Directive of Directive 77/388/EEC, when an adjustment occurs following an 
assessment of the VAT tax, only the person who applied the VAT deduction can be assessed a 
recovery by a member-state.335  In the case at bar, a supplier that had acquired some immovable 
property years earlier and chose at that time to opt for taxation on the property and had the VAT 
deducted sold the property to the plaintiff, Pactor Vastgoed, and both Pactor Vastgoed and the 
supplier once again opted for taxation on the property.336  Initially, Pactor Vastgoed leased the 
property, a transaction that was exempt from the VAT tax, but sometime later sold the property, 
also a transaction exempt from the VAT tax.337  The Dutch government believed that the 
transaction involving the initial sale of the property to Pactor Vastgoed under Dutch law should 
have been exempted from the VAT tax and thus issued an additional assessment of VAT tax 
against Pactor Vastgoed.338  In other words, the Dutch government contended that the supplier 
and Pactor Vastgoed should not have been able to elect taxation at the original sale.339  Pactor 
Vastgoed levied an objection to the additional assessment of VAT tax with the Dutch tax 
authorities, lost the objection, and then appealed to the Dutch courts, which in turn sent the issue 
to the ECJ for clarification under EU law.340 
 Article 4 of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC allows member-states to elect to 
subject to the VAT tax to transactions involving the sale of a building before it is first occupied, 
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or the sale of parts of the building, and/or the land on which the building sits.341  Article 13 of the 
Sixth Council Directive mandates that member-states exempt from the VAT tax the sale of 
buildings and/or the land on which the building will sit if the transaction is not covered by 
Article 4, but also permits member-states to provide the option to taxpayers to elect to pay taxes 
on those transactions.342 Article 17 allows a taxed person to deduct VAT taxes from a member-
state’s tax regime when goods or services are supplied to that same taxable person by another 
taxable person.343  Article 20 of the Sixth Council Directive allows member-states to make 
adjustments in VAT tax calculations when the VAT tax deduction was higher or lower than what 
was initially calculated in several scenarios, but whenever doing so, the member-state must make 
sure that the adjustment does not provide an unjustified advantage to one of the parties.344  
Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive allows the EU Council to adopt derogations to the 
general principles of the Sixth Council Directive to simplify a member-state’s tax regime so long 
as there is no effect on the final taxed amount at the last stage of consumption.345  Council 
Decision 88/498/EEC was adopted pursuant to Article 27 of the Sixth Council Directive of 
Directive 77/388/EEC, which allows the Netherlands government to impose VAT tax liability on 
the purchaser of buildings and/or parts thereof and/or land on which the building will sit.346 
 The Netherlands tax regime at the time of the case at bar allowed sales of immovable 
property to be immune from the VAT tax unless the sale of the building and/or the land on which 
the building sat was involved in a transaction involving its sale within two years of the building’s 
first occupation.347  Dutch law also stated that if improper use of the immovable property, such 
as activity that would not allow for a full deduction of the VAT tax, the Dutch government was 
allowed to apply an additional tax assessment to the seller.348   
 According to the ECJ, only the party that applied for the VAT tax deduction could be 
subject to a member-state’s attempt to adjust the VAT tax amount pursuant to Article 20 of the 
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.349  The ECJ further stated that it would go against the 
purpose of the Sixth Council Directive by allowing an adjustment of VAT tax to be levied 
against a party other than the party originally benefitting from the VAT tax deduction.350  More 
narrowly, the ECJ contended that the Sixth Council Directive was designed to maintain the 
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neutrality of the VAT tax and that any tax regime allowing another party to pay an amount 
following an adjustment would compromise the VAT tax system.351    
 Additionally, the ECJ found that, although the Sixth Council Directive does allow 
member-states some discretion when imposing the VAT tax, forcing a party to pay a VAT tax 
adjustment would go beyond what is allowed under EU VAT law.  Specific to the facts in the 
case at bar, when the transaction between the supplier and Pactor Vastgoed took place, that 
transaction was exempted from the VAT tax, and when the supplier applied for the VAT 
deduction and received the deduction, any later adjustment must be assessed by the supplier and 
at no time could the Netherlands government find that Pactor Vastgoed gained an “unjustified 
advantage” pursuant to Article 20 of the Sixth Council Directive.352  Furthermore, although 
Decision 88/498/EEC allowed member-states to assess VAT tax against the purchaser of 
immovable property, once the supplier became the recipient of the VAT deduction, only the 
supplier could be assessed an adjustment.353 
 
VI. DOMINANT THEMES FROM THE ECJ’S DECISIONS CONCERNING SIXTH COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 
77/388/EEC. 
 
 There are four dominant themes reflected in the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the Sixth Council 
Directive 77/388/EEC.  First, the ECJ does not allow member-states to determine the parameters 
of the VAT tax. According to the ECJ, member-states cannot use their inherent discretion 
associated with Directive 77/388/EEC to limit the ability to take advantage of the VAT tax based 
on the form of business organization chosen by the firm and whether or not profits are 
realized.354  The ECJ went further in Ambulanter stating that member-states cannot condition the 
use of the VAT tax deduction based on the form of business association, the location of the 
organization’s services, or the reason for the services.355  The ECJ also held that member-states 
cannot impede a firm’s use of the VAT tax deduction based on an arbitrary quantitative value 
such as the amount of membership fees charged by a nonprofit organization.356 
 The ECJ’s decision in Commission v. Belgium explicitly stated that Belgium’s 
derogations based on the price, use, and value of a car found in a pricing catalog to threaten the 
VAT tax harmonization sought by the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC and also warned 
member-states about government-identified price differences between imported and domestic 
cars.357  Member-states are also not permitted to make available a VAT tax deduction based on a 
judgment as to the quality of services rendered by an individual actor.358  In Werner Haderer, the 
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ECJ made it clear that divisions based on whether a university course is of high level should not 
dictate whether the economic actors should be entitled to a VAT tax deduction and such 
divisions could threaten the EU-wide VAT tax system.359  Member-states must only extend 
eligibility for the VAT tax deduction to those who have applied for the VAT tax deduction.360  
Furthermore, in Pactor Vastgoed, the ECJ stated that when a member-state allows for 
adjustments for VAT tax purposes to extend to parties other than those who have applied for the 
deduction, the member-state exceeds the scope of EU law, and the VAT tax system should be 
used by member-states in a way that does not allow for an unjustified advantage.361   
 In contrast to the above-mentioned cases on the point of member-state discretion on the 
scope of the VAT tax, the ECJ did state that member-states can define the activity supporting the 
claim that a VAT tax deduction is applicable.362  In Regie Dauphinoise, the ECJ held that 
member-states can bar interest on clients’ accounts from a VAT tax assessment when the service 
provider is believed to be trading for its own interest and not merely holding assets for clients.363 
 The second major theme from the ECJ’s jurisprudence is that the ECJ will not permit a 
member-state to implement barriers in the form of additional administrative measures that will 
interfere with access to VAT tax refunds.  In Molenheide, the ECJ found in violation of the Sixth 
Council Directive 77/388/EEC that a member-state’s preventive attachment system would 
require a firm seeking a VAT tax deduction to engage in additional administrative efforts to gain 
a VAT tax deduction since the preventive attachment itself created a presumption of 
ineligibility.364  Although the ECJ did not find the preventive attachment system a per se 
violation of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, the ECJ found Belgium’s approach to be 
disproportionate to its interests because the system in effect created an irrebuttable presumption 
against eligibility for a VAT tax deduction.365  Likewise, member-states cannot require economic 
actors seeking a VAT tax refund to accept a government bond in lieu of either taking the 
immediate deduction or carrying the deduction value forward.366  The ECJ made it clear that 
VAT tax refunds should be immediate, liquid, and delivered in a reasonable amount of time.367 
 Concerning the principle that any excess administrative barriers to a VAT tax deduction 
be prohibited, the ECJ in Ampliscientifica did allow a member-state to condition receipt of a 
VAT tax deduction collectively as one taxable person on the requirement that a parent firm own 
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50% of a subsidiary at the beginning of a taxable year, for which the ECJ found an allowable 
derogation from the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.368  However, in allowing this 
derogation that seemingly interfered with the idea that no additional administrative barriers exist, 
the ECJ put forth perhaps its best articulation of when derogations from the Sixth Council 
Directive will be allowed.369  Specifically, the ECJ stated that such derogations will be allowed 
when the member-state is treating similar goods and services in a similar manner (fiscal 
neutrality), the member-state is attempting to prohibit special arrangements to avoid taxes (abuse 
of rights), and the derogation is not excessive (proportionality).370 
 Third, the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the Sixth Council Directive reflects a willingness on 
the part of the ECJ to allow for variations among member-states in their discretion so long as 
there is no threat to harmonization of VAT tax law.  In Institute of the Motor Industry, the ECJ 
demanded that member-states not allow linguistic differences to alter VAT tax law that would 
allow for intolerable interference with harmonization.371  However, due to a perceived lack of 
threat to VAT tax harmonization in SUFA, the ECJ upheld the denial of a VAT tax exemption to 
a nonprofit organization that was supplying services to another nonprofit organization.372   
The Jetair NV case is perhaps the best articulation of the ECJ’s willingness to show 
flexibility in the face of the need for harmonization while also showing that flexibility and 
harmonization can work together.  Here, the ECJ stated that member-states can alter deadlines 
for economic actors, specifically setting such deadlines earlier for VAT tax purposes in order to 
get parties to act in a way that forces them to engage in activities that lead to harmonization 
earlier than required even if member-states would have differing deadlines for a limited time 
period.373  Also specific to the Jetair NV case, the ECJ held that member-states can continue to 
tax activities outside the EU so long as there is no risk to harmonization and the EU has not 
created a definitive system through legislative action on the subject matter of the member-state’s 
tax.374 
 Lastly, the ECJ has drafted opinions concerning the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC 
that allow for high levels of efficiency leading to the avoidance of trade distortion and tax 
evasion.  In Skripalle, the ECJ commented that derogations from the language in Directive 
77/388/EEC must be strictly construed and that tax evasion is likely to contribute to an allowable 
derogation while a member-state’s need for simplicity in calculation is not.375  In X BV, the ECJ 
made it clear that the thrust of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC is to make the transfer of 
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assets easier and distinguish transfer of shares from transfer of assets while allowing member-
states to decide when a VAT tax deduction should apply to a particular transaction involving the 
sale of shares by granting the freedom to decide what is an independent activity.376  Similar to 
the difficult distinction between a sale of shares and a sale of assets, the ECJ gave member-states 
the ability to tax a larger good at one VAT tax rate even when smaller goods included within the 
larger good and those smaller goods are taxed at a different VAT tax rate.377  The ECJ also held 
that there must be a link between the VAT tax deduction claim and the taxable activities 
supporting the claim.378 
 Perhaps the best example of an ECJ decision that promoted efficiency is found in the 
Navicon SA decision holding that a member-state cannot condition the availability of a VAT tax 
exemption on the requirement that an exporter of goods charter an entire cargo capacity of a 
vessel.379  According to the ECJ, to do otherwise would lead to a condition whereby the VAT tax 
system is not living up to the intent of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC.380  Additionally, 
the ECJ also remarked in Navicon SA that domestic law cannot interfere with the objectives of 
Directive 77/388/EEC.381  In Zita Modes, the ECJ claimed that member-states do have the 
flexibility to exclude the sale of goods from the total sale of assets that would otherwise be taxed 
through the VAT tax regime so long as distortion in competition does not exist.382  More 
narrowly, the ECJ commented that the prohibition on trade distortion practices will protect 
harmonization and prevent divergence among the member-states.383 
 There are, however, two cases cited in this work that could allow for trade distortions 
and/or tax avoidance.  In Gil Insurance, the ECJ let stand additional taxes that could be applied 
to the same transaction that would be covered by the VAT tax system but only so long as the 
additional taxes are not turnover taxes, the additional taxes do not interfere with cross-border 
trade among the member-states, and the additional taxes do not alter the final tax amount at the 
final stage of consumption.384  According to the ECJ, these additional taxes could be 
implemented by a member-state even if the tax rate does not match the VAT tax rate and even if 
the additional tax was not applied at the same point in the stream of commerce as the VAT 
tax.385  Furthermore, member-states need not acquire permission from the EU government to 
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levy the additional taxes.386  Similarly, in Kerrutt, the ECJ stated that member-states can 
implement additional taxes on the same transaction covered by the VAT tax regime even if it 
leads to double taxation of that transaction.387 
 
VII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIRECTIVE 77/388/EEC: THE POTENTIAL THREATS TO 
HARMONIZATION 
 
 Despite the above-mentioned dominant themes found in the ECJ’s jurisprudence on the 
Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, several threats exist to the mission of VAT tax 
harmonization throughout the EU.  The first lies with the ECJ’s position that, at least in some 
cases, the national courts of member-states should maintain some discretion.  For example, in 
Midland, after deciding that there needs to be an immediate link between a transaction and the 
claim for a VAT tax deduction, the ECJ held that national courts can decide whether this link 
exists.388  The ECJ’s decision that an immediate link must exist between the transaction and the 
claim would seemingly create a strong prophylactic against tax evasion, yet the decision 
threatens harmonization as each member-state court decides the same question differently.  If 
such discretion is left to the national courts of the member-states, taxable persons and entities 
will likely move their activities to member-states that maintain the most flexible rules on whether 
an immediate link exists.  Clearly, this is not what the Framers of the Sixth Council Directive 
77/388/EEC had envisioned.  Member-states, in order to attract investment would have an 
incentive to create very flexible rules creating a weak link between the transaction and the VAT 
tax deduction claim.  At worst, the only penalty for doing so is facing a complaint by a private 
party or the EU Commission followed by potentially lengthy litigation whereby the best result 
would be a favorable ECJ decision granting discretion.  This reality, in turn, would cause a race 
to the bottom leading to an evaporation of the revenue the member-state governments could use 
to reinvest in their countries. 
In Commission v. Italy, the ECJ firmly held that member-states cannot demand that 
taxable persons hold bonds in lieu of immediate VAT tax refunds, but still left the question of 
whether an additional requirement or non-cash refunds was proportionate to member-states’ 
needs in the face of Directive 77/388/EEC to the national courts in Molenheide.389  However, 
after digesting the opinions in Commission v. Italy and Molenheide, if a member-state 
government realizes that it cannot force a VAT tax refund declarant to hold a bond, the member-
state may believe that less onerous, yet more proportionate methods of providing VAT tax 
refunds may pass ECJ muster if the national court provides an approval.  Likewise, in EGI, the 
ECJ stated that member-states cannot insist on additional, burdensome administrative 
requirements in order for a taxable person to gain a VAT tax refund, yet still gave member-state 
courts the discretion to determine what might be an overly burdensome requirement that might 
                                                 
386 Id. at ¶ 44. 
387 Case C-73/85, Hans-Dieter & Ute Kerrutt v. Finanzamt Monchegladbach-Mitte, [1986] ECR 2219, at ¶ 
22. 
388 Case C-98/98, Comm’rs of Customs & Excise v. Midland Bank plc, [2000] at ¶¶ 19, 33. 
389 Case C-286/94, Molenheide BVBA v. Belgium; Case C-340/95, Peter Schepens v. Belgium; Case C-
47/96, Bureau Rik Decan-Business Research & Dev. NV; Case C-401/95, Sanders BVBA v. Belgium, [1997] ECR 
I-07281, at ¶ 64; Case C-78/00, Comm’n v. Italian Republic, [2001] ECR I-8195, at ¶¶ 5, 6, 39. 
THE GLOBAL BUSINESS LAW REVIEW   118 
 
interfere with the thrust of Directive 77/388/EEC.390  The ECJ also left the decision as to whether 
a firm’s consulting services are part of the firm’s overall economic activity for the purposes of 
the VAT tax regime when the consulting services are related to the sale of shares in X BV.391 
In the above cases on the subject mediums for VAT tax refunds, administrative 
requirements, and measuring the value of consulting services, the ECJ has opened the door to 
greater discretion among member-states and their national courts that could lead to greater 
differences among the member-states about the VAT tax regime, which puts VAT tax 
harmonization in jeopardy.  Member-states will certainly have the ability and incentive to 
experiment within the range of flexibility provided to them by the ECJ’s jurisprudence. 
 Relatedly, the ability of member-states to engage in double taxation and/or assess 
additional taxes on the same transaction poses a threat to overall harmonization of taxes across 
the EU even if the threat to VAT tax harmonization does not exist.  The Gil Insurance case is 
perhaps the best example of such a threat.  If a member-state is allowed to apply additional taxes 
to a transaction already covered by the VAT tax regime, the total tax amount of that transaction 
can increase substantially.  In Kerrutt, the ECJ went as far as to state that the Sixth Council 
Directive does not prohibit double taxation of transactions subject to the VAT tax system.392  
Such increased tax levels could lead to the movement of the production of goods and services to 
other member-states that merely maintain a traditional VAT tax on the transaction.  Although 
member-states are not likely to tax merchants and producers to the point that exodus from the 
original member-state is a likely option due to concerns over the loss of any tax revenue, the 
threat to tax harmonization still exists.   
 In addition, the judicial debate on these issues is too time consuming.  One could 
potentially think that the standards espoused by the various ECJ decisions cited in this work, 
including the requirement of fiscal neutrality and proportionality, would serve as adequate 
safeguards. There simply exists too much flexibility on the part of the member-state about 
whether fiscal neutrality is met and, likewise, whether a member-state’s legislation is 
proportional.  Relatedly, the adoption of later Council Directives such as 95/7/EC and 
2006/112/EC, which also allow for member-state discretion, do not force member-states toward 
harmonization but rather serve as guidelines as to how to get to a condition of harmony regarding 
the VAT tax. 
 Put bluntly, the various threats to harmonization of the VAT tax regime in the EU under 
the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC could be solved either by replacing the Directive with a 
Regulation or the end of the ECJ’s jurisprudential practice of allowing member-state national 
courts to maintain discretion, or preferably both.  As stated above, a Regulation is different from 
a Directive in that a Regulation does not provide member-states with the discretion to pass 
legislation to meet the intent of EU legislation; rather, it is directly effective on member-states 
without implementing domestic legislation.  Therefore, if EU law on the VAT tax were to be 
recrafted in the form of a Regulation, EU-wide VAT tax law would be much more harmonious.  
Likewise, if the ECJ left in place its black letter law holdings without providing an escape hatch 
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for member-states in the form of national court discretion, EU-wide VAT tax law would be 
further strengthened.  The ECJ’s decision in Jetair is a terrific example of this reality.  In Jetair, 
the ECJ stated that EU law tolerates differences in domestic law across the member-states so 
long as EU legislatures have not created a definitive legal regime on the subject matter at 
issue.393 
 Part of the responsibility of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC is to foster the cross-
border movement of goods.  As stated above, the ECJ is responsible for making sure the 28 
member-states follow EU law.  The flexibility noted above places the common market in 
jeopardy and increases the threat of tax avoidance.  Given the various threats to harmonization of 
VAT tax law across the EU, now is the time for greater legislative and judicial activism.  The 
efforts of the European Commission are limited to bringing complaints against member-states for 
non-compliance with Directive 77/388/EEC. Such use of this branch of EU government is not an 
efficient or effective means by which to bring legislative activism to promote harmonization of 
the VAT tax system through the replacement of Directive 77/388/EEC with a Regulation that 
would remove part of the discretion the member-states have in regard to the VAT tax through the 
adoption of implementing law.  The use of a Regulation would foreclose the problem identified 
in Jetair as the EU legislatures would have created a legal regime that ends much of the member-
state discretion threatening harmonization.  Judicial activism could come in the form of a series 
of ECJ decisions removing leeway from the member-states especially about leaving some 
decisions to national courts.  This two-part approach, the replacement of a Directive with a 
Regulation and the removal of flexibility within the national courts, should serve as forceful 
means by which to further harmonize VAT tax law across the EU’s 28 tax jurisdictions. It should 
also be noted that the adoption of a Regulation would immediately implement a harmonized 
VAT tax law without waiting for the 18-24 month implementation period.  Further, the EU 
government would spend fewer resources on tax compliance. 
 The threats identified here can be a chief barrier not only to the harmonization of VAT 
tax law across the EU, but also to further integration of the EU.  Such interference with 
integration can harm the EU’s global competitiveness as global firms curb their investment in a 
region that maintains uncertainty.  In contrast, greater reliability brought on by the use of a 
Regulation and less national court discretion would make the EU business environment more 
competitive.  A greater level of uniformity would also stabilize the accounting challenges 
associated with a 28-member EU.  One of the chief advantages of the VAT tax was that the total 
value added at each stage of production or distribution was equal to the total income earned.  If 
uncertainty is allowed to continue or worsen through increased legislative and judicial discretion 
at the member-state level, the values associated with the VAT tax could become less certain.  In 
other words, the “total value added” for the same good and the same transaction in one member-
state could be different in another member-state.  Such value differences could lead to 
accounting difficulties and investment uncertainty.  Perhaps the Zita Modes case, in which the 
ECJ gave member-states the discretion to use the no supply of goods rule, is the best example of 
this reality.394 
 A list of threats to harmonization is not to say that the ECJ has not done some admirable 
work on the issue of VAT tax harmonization.  The decisions in Kennemer Golf and Ambulater 
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gave firms the freedom to choose, without VAT tax discrimination, the form of business 
association that will best fit their needs which, presumably, would be the most efficient form of 




 The vision of the Framers of the Treaty of Rome was to create an “ever-closer union” 
among the member-states that would later constitute the EU.396  Following a 2016 referendum, 
the United Kingdom is scheduled to leave the EU on March 29, 2019.397  One of the chief 
concerns associated with the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU is the impact on financial 
markets.398  The void left by the United Kingdom’s contributions to the EU government’s budget 
could be substantial.399  One estimate of this tax deficit is between €10-15 billion per year that 
must be absorbed by the remaining 27 member-states.400  The risk to international trade has been 
perceived as so great that just before the June 2016 referendum, nearly one-third of the largest 
firms in the United Kingdom banded together to make clear that the best future for the United 
Kingdom requires that it remain with the EU.401  Regardless of the impact on the EU budget, the 
negotiations between the United Kingdom and the EU are in a very uncertain state because much 
international trade is threatened by the mere lack of agreement about what is to happen after 
March 29, 2019.402  Interestingly enough, the United Kingdom’s departure from the EU could 
give it an advantage in the war to attract large businesses as the United Kingdom would no 
longer have the restraints imposed by EU tax law.403 
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 The uncertainty posed by the threat of a United Kingdom exit from the EU is akin to the 
uncertainty the ECJ, and the EU government in general, leaves open by collectively allowing for 
member-state discretion in determining what implementing legislation can be used to meet the 
requirements of the Sixth Council Directive 77/388/EEC, allowing national courts to determine 
what member-state implementing legislation meets the requirements of Directive 77/388/EEC, 
and using a Directive instead of a Regulation to harmonize VAT tax law across the EU. 
 The level of VAT tax harmonization that exists in the EU should be described as fragile 
with a few sources of threat.  Although this work recommends transplanting a Directive with a 
Regulation, the author of this work admits that perhaps the flexibility of a Directive is what 
keeps many member-states in the EU, whereas the adoption of more Regulations may lead to 
further referendums by member-state polities as to whether to remain in the common market.  
However, not one member-state has left the EU since its founding. 
  
